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December 2006 Enduring relationships with key, credible, and influential local and regional leaders have historically proven to be the cornerstone to effective engagement with the populace of Afghanistan. After more than ten years of operations in Afghanistan, experience shows this to be true for international and coalition leaders at all levels. As the Afghan elders commonly state, the messenger is most often more important that the message. The true heart of the matter at present is not that the United States and its allies have not formed these relationships, but rather that they have not sustained/maintained these relationships for any significant period of time from an Afghan perspective. Fruitful and effective relationships can only be built and cultivated over time and therefore are neither easily nor quickly passed on to incoming leadership.
Leadership at all levels has changed over many times for all countries contributing to the campaign, as well as for many organizations aiding the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA). Unfortunately, given the protracted nature of the insurgency and the continued weakness of GIRoA, many more changeovers will likely occur before any significant change in Afghanistan's stability and 
Historical Background and Factors
Approaching Afghanistan from a historical perspective, one quickly gleans how critical it is to foster relationships with key leaders not only inside, but also outside of Kabul in order to facilitate governance of the country. The government of Afghanistan in its current form is a direct reflection of the past. Petraeus and remains in effect under the current COMISAF, General Allen. The directive helped streamline and coordinate efforts within ISAF, NATO, and to some extent with coalition embassies; however, the effort did little to alleviate coordination problems with other stakeholders, such as Non-Governmental Organizations, noncoalition embassies, private contractors, and numerous federal agencies. The international community in Afghanistan continues to function mostly on an ad hoc, shortterm basis 22 and remains largely untethered to any specific, complementary, or integrated objectives other than the objectives of its separate organizations and agencies. As such, the whole turns out to be smaller than the sum of its parts; in fact, it is not whole or assembled at all, but simply strewn about like pieces of a puzzle.
Catch-22
Rather than hold elections for governors or local leaders, Afghan President Karzai appoints them. While Karzai's approach is not without precedent, historically villagers in Afghanistan have enjoyed virtual autonomy, expecting only security guarantees from the central government. By appointing local leaders, prone to corruption, often incompetent, and with no relationship to the population, and by doing so without consultation, 232425 President Karzai has fostered discontent and local grievances against his government, thereby giving his enemies an easy avenue of exploitation against him. Such practices also put U.S./coalition forces and the international community in an untenable position. By endeavoring to partner with illegitimate appointed leaders, coalition forces lose credibility (unless these forces succeed in swiftly tempering the corruption and/or train the appointed leaders to become competent administrators and communicators). If U.S./coalition forces and the international community refuse to partner with these appointed leaders, Karzai and
GIRoA lose credibility and opponents of the government are emboldened.
In the end, the stance that U.S./coalition forces and the international community take in these circumstances should be based on the needs of the local environment.
They should endeavor to bring the central government and local community together through "genuine partnerships with local governments and civil society networks." We come and go as we please. They do not. Because we have the power, you will listen to us." 32 More poignantly, the insurgents illustrate their power in their ability to influence elected and appointed officials, effectively reducing officials' access to their constituents, tempering officials' rhetoric, and forcing officials' into inaction, complacency, corruption, and in some cases, treason. 33 The insurgents' power to hurt, therefore, keeps the population disconnected from the government. This disconnection enables the insurgency to then provide substitute governance by providing some of the services the government would normally provide-two prime examples are alternative justice and social assistance.
Although U.S./coalition forces in Afghanistan have much higher potential military force at their disposal, coalition forces cannot bring this force to bear in any decisive manner. Since the conflict is largely carried out in and amongst the population, U.S./coalition forces are constrained by international law and ethics with regard to treatment of noncombatants (rightly so), severely limiting the latent force available in most combat situations. In stark contrast, unhindered by international law and ethics, the insurgents' power to hurt is, in essence, unconstrained if not increased, and therefore actually of greater influence and utility than that of the coalition forces from the perspective of the populace. The populace is therefore compelled to accept the insurgents' presence and its substitute governance, even if the government has the capability to offer equal or better governance.
In the above illustration, the insurgents' power to hurt is congruent with Nathan's vision of effective military power. "Exploitable military power ought to exist short of massive firepower" and "be recognizable as capable of calling forth large and probable punishment if it is to be effective." 34 The insurgents' ability to regularly mete out punishment to those who act against their interests makes their power effective and enduring.
"In counterinsurgency, the population is the prize, and protecting and controlling it is the key activity. The war, therefore, is where the people are." 35 The insurgents live among the population. They know the language. They know the leadership hierarchy and interact with these leaders routinely. Being there, as part of the population, gives the insurgent a strategic advantage. The insurgents' ease of communication multiplies that advantage.
Removing the Insurgent Power Base-Provide Enduring Relationships
Kilcullen advocates four operational effects that the Afghan government and/or its partners must achieve in order to provide a consistent and predictable environment:
secure the people; separate them from the insurgents; help them choose their local leaders; and connect those leaders to the central government. 36 Achievement of these effects creates the space needed for development to occur. Given that U.S., coalition, and Afghan forces cannot bring their full military force to bear against the insurgents, the key is to reduce and replace the insurgents' power by successively increasing the protection the population, thereby separating them from the insurgents. A fundamental enabler of that protection is the capability to communicate with the population and to actually and intentionally do so regularly. To effectively communicate with the population, Afghan officials and partnered forces must form and maintain enduring relationships with key, credible, and influential voices at all levels. Furthermore, to attack, reduce, and eventually remove the power base of the insurgents, and therefore the insurgents' strategic advantage, partnered forces and Afghan government officials must be there. Specifically, Afghan officials and partnered forces must establish a presence, 37 38 be visible, actively listen, speak the truth, follow up on legitimate grievances, and most importantly stay there. As Kilcullen argues, "the more organized, locally present, better armed a group is, the more likely it is able to bring…the population the predictability and the order it craves." 39 However, Kilcullen also argues that a persistent presence methodology is not a sustainable long term strategy for counterinsurgent forces. 40 This is true. In the end, local Afghan security forces will be absolutely critical in the pursuit to keep the populace separate from insurgents and on a predictable path to development; however, throughout the insurgent removal and beyond, Afghan officials, appointed and otherwise, together with international partners, must maintain steady-state functioning relationships with key influencers and credible voices in order to achieve unity of purpose, even in a secure environment. "Success depends on the closest possible integration between the military and the non-military actors on the stage if unity of purpose is to be achieved." 41 Build the Future Framework Leading Afghanistan analysts, academics, authors and government officials resoundingly agree, civilians need to take the lead in an interagency effort in Afghanistan to facilitate greater local diplomacy and development efforts. 42 The impetus is to create unity of command, purpose, and responsibility to pull together the many actors and agencies the U.S. has operating in Afghanistan, so that the whole of the U.S. effort can then integrate more effectively and efficiently with the greater international and host government effort, as Lieutenant General Shirreff calls for. 43 Michele Defense Review (QDR) should capture this force in its recommended force structure along with the major combat elements.
One of the six key mission areas in the current QDR is-succeed in counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations. 48 This mission area effectively combines two core mission areas from the 2009 Quadrennial Roles and
Missions Review Report (QRM)-Irregular Warfare and Military Support to Stabilization
Security, Transition, and Reconstruction. 49 The QRM states that General Purpose Forces (GPF) will continue to play a leading role in these missions and advocates GPF "will need a greater degree of language and cultural instruction" 50 to execute these missions effectively. The DoD Vision for "Responsibilities for Irregular Warfare and
Continued Institutionalization" included in the QRM outlines a departmental goal to "better integrate with interagency partners to leverage all elements of national power to meet national security objectives" 51 and to support maturation of whole-of-government approaches to national security problems by employing integrated, flexible, mutuallysupporting interagency capabilities. 52 The Department of State (DOS), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and DoD have formed a Diplomacy, Development, and Defense (3D) planning group 53 to better institutionalize planning and to recommend organization, training, and desired capabilities for these missions. To further implement this vision, DoD also needs to institutionalize the concept in the Active Component (AC) and form a dedicated force to train and equip for this mission set. 54 Given the focused emphasis on this key mission area, which is population-centric and relies heavily on enabling effective governance and reconstruction, the QDR outlines current efforts for a robust Civil Affairs Expeditionary Force of no less than a brigade in size in the AC. The much-needed and much-requested role such a force can play in the current operational environment, the veritable certainty of its continued role near-term in Afghanistan, and the high likelihood of the long-term continued need of a professional and dedicated Civil Affairs Expeditionary Force, demands its inclusion in the QDR-proposed active component force structure in order to highlight its priority and to assure proper/equitable allocation of resources. 55 The QDR's focus on providing "more and better key enabling capabilities" in order for U.S. forces to "be able to perform their missions more effectively" 56 is on target and includes improvements in both systems and skills. With regard to skills, the language training detachments that will enable language/cultural skills to be trained and improved in theater need a very high priority. These skill providers are high pay-off for minimal investment and are needed now and for the foreseeable future.
"Enhance linguistic, regional, and cultural ability" is a key QDR initiative 57 that rightly identifies that the language, cultural, and regional expertise required for operations such as partnering with host-nation security forces takes years, not weeks, to develop. The way, and perhaps more importantly where, we train our linguists needs a more modern and more flexible approach coupled with a rapidly adaptive curriculum. As an example, the base curriculum stateside would train the foundational skills of the target language across the linguist force. The in-theater detachments would tailor their curriculum to include current events, colloquialisms, and cultural nuances based on experiences in theater. The forward-deployed training detachments will enable the boots-on-the-ground (BOG) face-to-face enablers critical for counterinsurgency, stability, and counter-terrorist operations and will ensure the locals will not complain in a language our forces do not understand. 58 To meet this need, the Department of Defense has allocated $33 million to "expand language training centers to fund ten language training detachments to support general purpose forces in ongoing operations" and $14 million for "language, regional expertise, and culture training for special operations forces." 59 Given current fiscal realities, dollar for dollar, these centers are an extremely cost effective force multiplier that may benefit from further expansion in the near future.
Constraints on manning the force will dramatically challenge U.S. Forces ability to maintain sufficient capacity and capability to address the entire spectrum of threats.
Given the necessity to drawdown our forces, the Civil Affairs Expeditionary Force described above cannot add numbers to our forces and will have to draw its numbers out of existing AC forces.
Over the course of the next five years, in accordance with Department of Defense planning, the AC will shed 72 thousand personnel. Our forces will "no longer be sized for large scale, prolonged stability operations." Instead, "certain specialized capabilities, once on the margins, will move to the forefront." 60 In accordance with this plan, the expertise required to stand up the Civil Affairs Expeditionary Force can initially be drawn out of special operations forces and from there expanded and developed to meet operational needs as undermanned and/or underutilized forces are drawn down.
DoD needs to increase our armed forces' ability to succeed in counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations by bringing our CA forces to a more advanced state: by creating the separate brigade structure described above; by increasing CA capacity through cooperative measures and training; and through the creation of an integrated interagency database for stability and transition operations.
"There are few cases in which the U.S. Armed Forces would engage in sustained large-scale combat operations without the associated need to assist in the transition to just and stable governance." 61 The QDR appropriately identifies the need to expand CA capacity to meet that need and enhance U.S. Government (USG) efforts to assist partner governments in the areas of "rule of law, governance, public health and welfare, infrastructure, and public education and information." The enemy is adaptive and situational awareness is paramount in the day-to-day efforts of stability and counterinsurgency operations; therefore, to fully integrate all of these assets, the interagency will need to create and maintain common databases and common reports at all levels of classification for ease of information sharing, pulling, or pushing. Through common interfaces, units, intelligence, and agency assets in theater, as well as stateside, will be able to populate the databases immediately following operations, key leader engagements, and other activities to keep information and intelligence current. Having such a database will allow for real-time networking between units and assets geographically separated, but operating in the same Area of Responsibility (AOR).
In order to create and sustain the Civil Affairs Expeditionary Force, DoD must provide the people, organizational structure, equipment, and training requirements by establishing this force as a top priority. This priority should, in turn, ensure the needed means to fund it. As shown in Afghanistan, CA forces such as those included in
Provincial Reconstruction Teams offer a bona-fide cost savings over large combat units 65 while still providing self-protection and population-centric engagement. Kunduz, and Kandahar, plus the possible addition of Jalalabad. These sub-HQs should be staffed to a level to be able to push out weekly to each province in efforts to remain engaged with key and credible influencers. These staffs would be tied at the hip to the local government in each area and seek to deconflict and coordinate all programs, reduce corruption, and mediate between the local government, elders, religious leaders, and central government.
Central to the establishment of a presence in these traditional ethnic sub-zones will be the necessity to build train and equip centers for reconstruction and development. Afghans are and have been eager to cooperate in the rebuilding of their country. 67 Unfortunately, only since 2010 have NATO, the International Security Assistance Force, and the international community adopted and "Afghan first" policy for reconstruction and development projects. Under this policy, international assistance seeks to use locally procured goods and services "whenever the acceptable standards for security, quality, price, and reliable supply are met." 68 Regional train and equip centers will provide Afghans the training and expertise needed to qualify for reconstruction and development projects. Interagency strategic partners in conjunction with the Deputy Minister of Youth Affairs should endeavor to create the equivalent of a regional conservation corps for youth 69 in order to employ them in programs immediately afterwards for more hands-on experience and service to their communities. By actively engaging and educating youth, hungry for jobs and self-respect, it provides skills and options. More importantly, it takes them out of the fight.
Given appropriate integration of interagency assets, such a program can be turned into a ground floor to graduate process, and include avenues to further development, such as literacy and private company start-up at the regional and local level. Sustainment will be the goal. Relationships with local elders and officials are critical to enable and maintain this effort. For the locals, the process (the relationships formed and maintained) will be more important than the product. Local leaders and future entrepreneurs will naturally emerge in the course of this process.
As DoD rebalances the force, its leaders must take into account the lessons of the last 11 years in Iraq and Afghanistan and recognize the importance of CA forces.
DoD needs to resource, man, and develop this modern contingency force so that it can both aid in the prevention of conflict in failing states and ensure the more rapid recovery of states post conflict. To meet this need, a Civil Affairs Expeditionary Force should be created and resourced with personnel, equipment, and training that will enable it to deploy rapidly into any theater with appropriate/robust linguistic support and to rapidly network with interagency assets in cooperative efforts. The QDR should include this force in the Force Structure, FY 2016-2020 to solidify its priority as a critical part of the U.S. Armed Forces in the current and future global environment.
Conclusion
Doctrine is always slow to respond and "bureaucratic torpor is its own force of nature." 70 Is there another way to improve stability and development efforts right now while the right task force or separate agency is formed? Looking at the problem through an Afghan lens, there are two things that DoD and the interagency can do immediately.
The first recommendation is the need to change our thinking about how we engage with key and influential Afghans and more importantly, how we manage the requisite relationships over the long-term. Afghans do not enter into functional relationships lightly. Good and effective relationships take time and personal investment. "Trust has to be built up over time. You can't surge trust." 71 One year is barely enough time to establish a sound and trusting relationship, but that is the average length of a coalition key leader's tour in Afghanistan. Rotation of personnel, while necessary for the home front, is destructive to stability and development, or at the very least is a regular brake to progress and an opportunity for the enemy to exploit.
Given this, we must establish longer turnover periods for those coalition leaders who are partnered with Afghan officials, with added emphasis at the regional and local level where units, agencies and organizations implement plans and programs. This turnover should be no less than three months side by side in order for the new leader to firmly establish the new relationship through repeated consultation, active listening, follow-up processes and actions. Both incoming and outgoing leaders must take great care to ensure that all critical relationships are fully turned over and that no previous promises are broken. Broken promises lead to apathy, distrust, and disaffection, all of which destroy hope. Maintaining these relationships-making sure the relationships endureis the key to the continuity, consistency, and stability that the Afghan populace is seeking.
The second recommendation is a PPD firmly establishing a lead civilian authority, a lead agency, and designated supporting agencies. This directive must go beyond the goals stated in the 2010 Strategic Framework for U.S. Efforts in Afghanistan and assign directive authority and overall responsibility to the lead civilian. In conjunction with the issuance of this directive, POTUS could also issue a call to serve in this lead agency, not unlike President Kennedy when he called upon Americans to join the Peace Corps or to find other ways to "ask what you can do for your country."
Perhaps President Karzai could echo this by issuing a call to service to the youth of Afghanistan.
This leads to the final recommendation-the greater international effort needs to focus the lion's share of its effort on the welfare, education, development, and employment of youth in Afghanistan. This is not only because they are the future of Afghanistan, but because youth are the majority in Afghanistan (65%) 72 , they are the primary recruiting field for the enemy, 73 and they remain largely disenfranchised from the hierarchical and collective leadership system in Afghanistan. Furthermore, it is youth that are more likely to challenge old norms and practices in an attempt to create a world that better meets their needs. 74 While on the surface this seems to militate against building relationships with local elders, it does not and should not. These youthfocused efforts should provide youth with the tools and knowledge to better serve their country and their people. Furthermore, even in the absence of dramatic social change, these efforts will equip Afghan youth to be better elders and leaders when their opportunities to lead manifest.
We should approach Afghan stability and development focused just as much on the process (ways)-the influential relationships formed and the time spent working together-as on the product (ends)-the institutions built and the skills and methods taught. To ensure enduring results from our capacity-building efforts in Afghanistan, we will need enduring, reliable, predictable, and respectful relationships with credible and influential Afghans. In essence, the ways to get things done in Afghanistan are an end in themselves.
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